Ruling the Country Through Corruption, Ruling the Party Through “Anti-Corruption”

Xi’s Evil Authoritarian Model

[People News] After the cases involving Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli came to light, the military newspaper published only two major articles. The first defined their case as “trampling on the responsibility system of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission.” In the second article, the tone changed: the phrase “trampling on the responsibility system of the Chairman of the CMC” disappeared, corruption was mentioned again instead, and only obedience and trust toward the CMC chairman were emphasized. What does this change indicate?

Such a drastic shift in the main line of criticism proves the case was handled hastily, without enough time for preparation. Even the charges had not been thoroughly thought through or weighed for their political consequences. Later, they realized that this accusation had negative effects, so they hurried to stop using it.

Why was the charge of “trampling on the responsibility system of the CMC chairman” problematic? The reason is simple: it reduced Zhang and Liu’s wrongdoing merely to disobedience toward Xi Jinping, which in turn implied that Xi was using the “CMC chairman responsibility system” to eliminate dissent, further exposing his ambition to place personal dictatorship above collective leadership.

Collective leadership has been an organizational principle emphasized by the CCP Central Committee over the past two years, with the purpose of weakening the personal dictatorship of the Party chairman and the CMC chairman. If collective leadership is emphasized, personal dictatorship must be opposed. Therefore, accusing Zhang and Liu of “trampling on the responsibility system of the CMC chairman” effectively endorsed Xi overriding other CMC members and directly negated collective leadership.

The CMC chairman responsibility system is written into the Constitution, but in past CCP discourse it was never emphasized. Mao and Deng were both CMC chairmen and in fact held military power, so there was no need to stress it. During the Hu-Wen era, the position of CMC chairman was long dominated by Jiang Zemin, but at that time the Party focused on economic development, and the position was essentially reserved but not actively used.

Under Xi, he originally placed He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Li Shangfu in key roles, using his confidants to remotely control the CMC, so there was no need to stress the chairman responsibility system. But after those three were purged, Xi was effectively sidelined in the CMC, with real power falling into Zhang Youxia’s hands. This posed the greatest threat to Xi’s lifelong rule, so Xi was determined to remove Zhang as quickly as possible.

Defining Zhang Youxia’s crime as “trampling on the responsibility system of the CMC chairman” was too blunt a confession of Xi’s ambition to monopolize military power. Moreover, concrete evidence for this charge would be hard to present, and even if it existed, it would be difficult to explain clearly within the Party. Instead, it would give the impression that Xi abused his power to eliminate rivals, aiming to purge dissent in the military and seize absolute control.

As for reassigning Zhang and Liu’s case to corruption, that was the most convenient backup plan. Xi’s dark purpose of eliminating rivals could not be too openly displayed, while evidence of corruption against Zhang and Liu must have been plentiful. Therefore, the military newspaper’s shift in tone can be seen as a timely “patch-up.”

At this point, saying that no one in the CCP, the military, or the government is corrupt has become a huge joke. In the CCP officialdom, it is impossible to be an official without engaging in corruption. Your integrity would be a challenge and threat to all corrupt officials, and you would soon be legally sidelined. Corruption has long become the norm, the lubricant of regime operations, and part of official “social etiquette.”

At the beginning of reform and opening-up, Hong Kong economist Steven Cheung once suggested that the CCP tolerate a certain level of corruption to serve as an initial driving force for economic reform. At that time, Party officials were not well paid, and without material incentives, grassroots officials would lack motivation. This suggestion was adopted by the CCP and echoed in Hu Yaobang’s phrase “let some people get rich first.”

Hu Yaobang may not have intended to encourage corruption among Party officials, but in practice, the first beneficiaries—apart from a small number of private entrepreneurs—were officials at various levels who handled massive investment funds.

After forty years of indulgence in corruption, the entire CCP has been shaped by it. Now there is no internal or external force capable of stopping this evil trend. Appetites have grown larger, and methods more brutal. Starting from the very top, dozens of “red families” have carved up state assets, and below them officials at every level use illegal means to distribute benefits, all the way down to the grassroots.

The central government uses GDP figures to measure performance, allowing huge investments to pass through the hands of officials at all levels to produce attractive economic numbers and impressive physical projects, thereby proving the correctness of the Party’s line. At the same time, officials at all levels share the benefits, effectively encouraging corruption in officialdom.

Meanwhile, the CCP also tolerates the spread of crooked practices among the public. In every corner of society where power is involved, there are bribes. Doctors, nurses, and even cleaners in hospitals expect red envelopes. Teachers openly accept gifts from parents. A friend even said that in kindergartens, children who want to be class monitor must give gifts to classmates to “buy votes.”

Corruption throughout society echoes corruption in the Party, the military, and all levels of government. Social corruption highlights official corruption, and official corruption shields social corruption, mutually legitimizing each other. Because there is corruption among the people, corruption in officialdom becomes even more unrestrained; because there is corruption in officialdom, social corruption feels more justified.

The CCP’s so-called anti-corruption has never been about building institutions. Institutional construction requires supporting systems, but the CCP never requires officials to disclose personal assets, never allows public or media oversight, and has never set up internal government mechanisms to prevent corruption—such as requiring independent audits for major investments or open and transparent bidding. The only anti-corruption bodies are the CCDI and the military discipline commission, which are not for prevention but for selective prosecution.

Corruption across the Party and the whole society cannot be governed, so why does the CCP constantly raise the banner of anti-corruption? Because anti-corruption has become a legitimate excuse for the central leadership to selectively purge political enemies. Whoever disobeys or shows signs of dissent will be investigated by the discipline commission, and none will escape. There is more than enough evidence; charges can be picked at will and always hit the mark. The key is not whether you are corrupt, but whether you are one of “my people” and which side you stand on.

Today, officials in the CCP system all live with their heads on the line. In the past, when the economy was good, being an official brought benefits and motivation. Now the economy is bad, sources of illicit income have dried up, and many might prefer to lie flat and slack off. But with the sword of anti-corruption hanging overhead, they must pretend to work hard to avoid disaster from above. The CCP’s anti-corruption aims to tame officials at all levels.

Using universal corruption to cover up corruption in officialdom, and using anti-corruption in officialdom as a tool of political purge—the entire CCP system operates in this evil model. If this time it were not Xi who took down Zhang Youxia, but Zhang who took down Xi, the most convenient charge to pin on Xi would also be corruption.

For such a poisonous system to hope for longevity, for such a degraded nation to still have a future—there would be no justice in heaven. Justice may be slow but never absent. One day there will be a reckoning in China. The problem is that after the CCP collapses, the spiritual and cultural condition of the Chinese nation will still need a complete rebirth. That will be the most troublesome part, and how much turmoil lies in between, no one knows.

(Reposted from the author’s Facebook) △