Strange Signals in State Media Suggest Resistance to Xi Reclaiming Absolute Dominance

age: During the March 2024 Two Sessions, Xi Jinping was photographed by foreign media in the Great Hall of the People with an expression of extreme pain while drinking tea. (Illustration by Qing Yu/People News)

[People News]After the CCP officially announced on January 24 that Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Joint Staff Department Chief Liu Zhenli were under investigation, official and military websites briefly reverted to a reporting pattern seen several years ago: major news about Xi Jinping once again dominated the top headlines for extended periods, creating the impression that “Boss Xi” was re-establishing supreme authority.

However, in recent days, observers have noticed a peculiar shift: important Xi-related news has not remained in the headline position for long on official and military media sites.

During the daytime on February 4, Xi’s key publicized activity was his February 3 meeting with Uruguay’s president. Yet throughout the day, the main headlines on major official websites — including military portals, Xinhua, People’s Daily Online, the State Council site, and the CPPCC website — instead featured a policy document titled:

“Opinion of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Anchoring Agricultural and Rural Modernization and Advancing Comprehensive Rural Revitalization.”

This document had actually been made public back on January 3, though more details were released this time. Still, it was hardly breaking news.

Only later that afternoon and evening, after Xi held calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Donald Trump, did those sites update their top headlines. For Xi, these two calls would have been prime opportunities to showcase his international stature.

Yet by the morning of February 5, news of “Xi Jinping’s Phone Call with U.S. President Trump” and “Xi Jinping’s Video Meeting with Russian President Putin” had already been removed from the top headline position on those same official sites. They were demoted to secondary lead stories.

The new top headline instead became:

“Top Leaders of China and Laos Jointly Announce the Launch of ‘China–Laos Friendship Year.’”

This referred to Xi’s reply letter to the General Secretary and President of Laos, jointly declaring 2026 the “China–Laos Friendship Year” and launching related events.

Clearly, compared with calls between Xi and the leaders of the United States and Russia, this Laos-related story carried far less weight. One notable difference: the Laos headline did not include Xi’s name directly.

If Xi had truly regained firm support within the Party and the military after moving against Zhang and Liu — reestablishing himself as the sole dominant authority — state media would be expected to emphasize Xi-centered reporting more consistently.

Adding to the oddity, around 8 p.m. on February 5, People’s Daily Online replaced its headline yet again, this time with a feature story titled:

“‘New Stories in the Southern City’: The Coexistence Code in an Old Alley.”

Did Xi really have no other major activities that day?

According to the author, these unusual shifts on official and military websites suggest that after targeting Zhang and Liu, Xi has not fully reasserted control as expected. Instead, he may be encountering resistance within the Party and the armed forces.

For example, the hastily convened NPC Standing Committee session did not revoke Zhang and Liu’s status as National People’s Congress deputies.

Does this indicate that Xi’s effort to return to unquestioned, one-man dominance is facing significant obstacles?

Whether Xi is temporarily keeping a low profile while preparing a larger purge, or whether internal forces are actively constraining him, remains to be seen. But one point seems clear: the challenges Xi has encountered since moving against Zhang and Liu could, if mismanaged, prove destabilizing not only for him personally but for the CCP system as a whole.△