With Zhang Youxia Down, Could He Weidong and Miao Hua Be Rehabilitated?

March 11, 2023: Senior members of the CCP’s Central Military Commission line up to take the oath at the National People’s Congress. From right to left: Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmin. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] Independent commentator Du Zheng wrote in Taiwan’s Up Media that He Weidong and Miao Hua joined forces to move against Zhang Youxia and succeeded in bringing down Zhang’s close ally Li Shangfu. Zhang later decided to strike back, gathering evidence of corruption and disloyalty involving He and Miao, which forced Xi to purge them. Now that Zhang himself is under investigation, there are signs Xi may be reactivating personnel linked to He Weidong. This raises the question: could the cases against He and Miao be reversed?

Du Zheng revealed that He Weidong and Miao Hua advised Xi to begin investigations in the equipment procurement system and the Rocket Force. This led to the downfall of Rocket Force commander Li Yuchao, political commissar Xu Zhongbo, and then–Defense Minister Li Shangfu — indirectly targeting Zhang Youxia. He later aimed accusations at Zhang, alleging faulty equipment procurement and falsified training performance. Zhang retaliated by collecting evidence of He’s corruption, especially proof that Miao sold military posts for profit, pressuring Xi to approve investigations into He, Miao, and members of their faction.

According to a Caixin report, besides the Beijing Garrison, new provincial military district leaders appeared in mid-January at party committee meetings in the Shanghai Garrison and in Anhui, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Hainan, Jilin, and Sichuan. Shen Mingshi of Taiwan’s Institute for National Defense and Security Research said this suggests that after Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were purged, Xi significantly replaced officials previously cultivated by Zhang, instead promoting figures associated with He Weidong or Miao Hua. This has led to numerous new local commanders and a wave of cross–service and cross–branch transfers.

Given the lack of follow-up information on the handling of He and Miao — and the absence of sustained critical media coverage — some observers believe the downplaying is intentional. As more individuals linked to He and Miao take up leadership posts in the military, analysts speculate whether their cases might quietly fade away, or whether they could even be released on bail pending trial. If He and Miao were rehabilitated, Zhang and Liu’s fate would almost certainly be sealed.

Are such speculations entirely unfounded? Not necessarily. Xi is now focused on securing another term at the upcoming Party Congress, and anyone blocking that path may be removed. Conversely, those who help smooth the way could be rewarded. If people aligned with He and Miao perform actively and win Xi’s favor, they could become trusted aides. Over time, they might persuade Xi that He and Miao were wronged by rivals, making sentence reductions or medical parole conceivable. Given Xi’s age, health concerns, and reputed suspicious, even paranoid tendencies, his mental and physical stamina may be waning, increasing the chance he could be influenced by those around him.

Claims that Xi shows signs of paranoia are not just rumors; they appear in assessments by U.S. intelligence agencies. These assessments point not merely to his actions against former allies like Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli or the arrest of more than ten vice-ministerial-level officials in early 2026, but to what they describe as a “Stalin-style logic.” Extreme rigidity, selective trust, and deep suspicion have reportedly reached severe levels, with the structural contradictions of authoritarian rule taking a psychological toll. Unnamed current and former U.S. officials told media outlets they had seen no evidence that Zhang Youxia intended to rebel, nor any proof he passed nuclear secrets to the United States. U.S. intelligence also found no indication Beijing itself was spreading claims that Zhang was an American spy.

Yet Xi may still harbor such suspicions, driven by his psychological state. Living in constant tension, surrounded by uncertainty, he may question which confidants are truly loyal and which are double-faced. “An autocratic ruler lives in constant danger, feeling besieged on all sides, inevitably becoming paranoid and fearful.”

Former CIA China analyst John Culver noted that Xi had to politically destroy many powerful elders to reach his current position. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung similarly commented that purging senior officers like Zhang highlights Xi’s deep mistrust of the military: “The nature of authoritarian politics is to suspect everyone, especially close associates.”

Under such conditions, no one — including those newly promoted from He or Miao’s circles — is truly safe. Anyone could fall under suspicion at any time, unless the system itself collapses. On one hand, the CCP may view internal purges as controllable, easing or pausing them when regime security is at stake. On the other hand, the root cause lies in the authoritarian system itself: all officials are entirely dependent on the Party structure. Even after one group is purged, those who rise next still operate to preserve the same system.

Xi has positioned himself as an emperor, with an extreme attachment to power. Anyone near him — even close allies, regardless of faction — faces uncertain prospects. As Wu Guoguang, a senior research scholar at Stanford University’s Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, noted, after He Weidong and Miao Hua fell, Zhang Youxia had to be dealt with as well. This reflects the structural contradiction of autocratic politics: the supreme ruler cannot allow any single faction below him to grow too strong. This is the “Stalin logic” — the more purges, the more centralized power becomes; the more concentrated power is, the more likely decisions become misguided, and the more people ultimately suffer.△