Strict Governance of the Party is a Form of Crisis Management, and Xi Jinping Seems Oblivious to the Impending Dangers.

Xi Jinping. (People News)

[People News] During a recent regular meeting of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC), it was decided to hold the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee in October this year, with the core agenda set as 'continuously advancing strict governance of the Party'.

Traditionally, the CPC's Fifth Plenary Session focuses on discussing the five-year economic plan. However, at a time when China's economy is grappling with a widespread and deep crisis, and there are various expectations from both domestic and international observers regarding the CPC's new economic policies, the Party is taking an unusual approach by prioritizing 'strict governance of the Party' over economic recovery.

While it is true that the CPC lacks effective strategies to address the current economic challenges, it is clear to anyone with common sense that the greatest threat to the CPC regime right now is the issue of unemployment. The ongoing rise and deepening of unemployment will lead to widespread hardships for the lower classes. With no viable means of survival, the populace may resort to desperate measures, ultimately forcing the CPC to confront the collapse of its regime.

This potential outcome is evident to ordinary citizens, and the CPC has no reason to ignore it. The pressing question is whether the economy can be salvaged. If it cannot, the only course of action is to prepare for the most severe social crisis. To effectively manage external threats, internal stability must first be achieved. In order to tackle the social crisis, the Party must reorganize its ranks, ensuring that every member is fully alert. When a crisis arises, the entire Party must unite, pooling their wisdom and strength to quell any potential social unrest.

The real estate market is currently sluggish, and investment has become overly saturated, leading to exhausted government finances that prevent the development of new investment projects. Without new projects, grassroots officials lack incentives; without incentives, there is no motivation or enthusiasm for work. Promotions, too, are fiercely competitive, often requiring individuals to endure significant struggles and sacrifices.

Consequently, mid- and lower-level officials face a challenging reality: they must manage local administrative operations, address various social issues, handle pressure from superiors, and remain vigilant about unexpected incidents. They are overwhelmed daily, not only without any benefits to gain but also fearing being randomly selected as examples in anti-corruption campaigns, creating an unbearable work environment. Under such circumstances, who would be willing to dedicate themselves to serving the Party?

However, at this critical moment, the Party requires officials at all levels to be fully committed, with everyone prepared to risk their lives and interests to protect the Party’s survival. The economic outlook is grim, and future crises are unavoidable. Thus, the pressing question is whether the Party can endure the challenges that lie ahead.

Since Xi Jinping (Xi Jinping) took office over a decade ago, the anti-corruption campaign has been a continuous effort aimed at intimidating Party officials. Corruption has deeply infiltrated the Communist Party, which is reluctant to allow freedom of speech or social oversight. Relying solely on its own supervisory bodies is insufficient to address the issue, as these bodies are often more corrupt. In a situation with no escape, Xi Jinping has no choice but to enforce strict governance of the Party to maintain central authority.

From now until the eventual collapse of the Communist Party of China (CPC), life will be challenging for party officials at all levels, as the strict governance measures are directed at them. The CPC has various methods for enforcing strict governance; for instance, during the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong eliminated many old revolutionaries as a means of party control. Xi Jinping might also launch a movement reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, encouraging the masses to criticize party officials.

For Xi Jinping, implementing strict governance poses a significant risk. If executed effectively, party officials at all levels will live in constant fear and will have no choice but to comply. However, this approach is likely to generate widespread resentment among mid- and lower-level cadres. As expressed in the Min Nan dialect, 'You get no sweet rewards but only sufferings,' indicating that they are deprived of benefits while enduring hardships. Consequently, party officials arrive at work each day filled with frustration, and even if everyone is expected to give their all, they often end up venting their anger.

Mid- and lower-level party officials confront specific social issues daily. To effectively tackle these problems, having financial resources is crucial, yet the current predicament for party officials is that they lack funds. With the government short on money and needing to engage with the public, party officials resort to various deceptive tactics to placate the masses. When the public's demands go unaddressed, it is only natural for them to gather and protest. When unrest arises, grassroots party officials will likely resort to harsh measures to suppress it, which will quickly escalate tensions between the officials and the public, making life even more difficult for the CPC.

Thus, while Xi Jinping's decision for strict governance of the party appears to be a proactive measure in anticipation of future crises, it is ultimately a misguided strategy of robbing Peter to pay Paul. The external social pressures are already substantial, and strict governance will inevitably create more internal challenges for the party, leading to ongoing struggles, a pervasive sense of insecurity, a decline in party loyalty, and ineffective governance.

Catching a party official inevitably requires replacing them; the more officials are apprehended, the more replacements are needed. If all the capable individuals are caught, how much fighting strength can the party retain with those who are ineffective? Moreover, when everyone lacks a sense of security and enthusiasm for their work, waiting for instructions and executing tasks half-heartedly, minor issues will escalate into major problems, and major problems could become life-threatening.

The strict governance of the party is brewing a political storm. Party officials at all levels are lining up to face consequences; who still has the capacity to think about local administration? Who has the time to soothe and care for the public? Consequently, local social issues are piling up, becoming increasingly serious and difficult to manage. Ultimately, when conflicts erupt everywhere, it will still be Xi Jinping who has to confront them directly.

The greed of party officials has been fostered by the Communist Party of China over the past forty years, and this greed is now backfiring on the party itself. Today, it is too late for strict governance of the party. Xi Jinping, at his wit's end, seeks to employ the harsh methods of old Mao to salvage the Communist Party from its impending doom. With Xi Jinping's greed clouding his judgment, if he does not govern the party, it may be manageable, but if he continues, he risks destroying the party entirely.

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