Zhang Youxia Pushes the “Xi Drama” to a New Climax

File photo of Zhang Youxia (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] On November 12, Zhang Youxia, First Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), published an article in People’s Daily titled “Promoting High-Quality Modernization of National Defense and the Armed Forces.” The very beginning mentions the “Xi core” and Xi’s “Strong Military Thought”; the full text mentions Xi 20 times, with almost every major paragraph referring to Xi.

Since the Third Plenary Session last July, Zhang Youxia’s public speeches or articles had mentioned Xi far less, only symbolically. For this article to mention Xi so many times is quite rare.

Commentators have offered various interpretations—some say Xi’s power is solid, some say Zhang Youxia is compromising with Xi. How should we view Zhang’s sudden “praising Xi”? Here are my modest thoughts.

First, this is a response to the rumor of “Xi down, Zhang up.”

Before the Fourth Plenum, overseas rumors about “Xi stepping down and Zhang stepping up” were flying everywhere. Some said Xi would resign as CMC chairman at the Fourth Plenum and Zhang Youxia would take over; some said Zhang would join with so-and-so to restructure the Politburo Standing Committee; some said Xi would not only resign as CMC chairman but might also resign as CCP General Secretary.

Before the CCP’s 20th Party Congress in 2022, the overseas rumor of “Xi down, Li up” was boiling. “Li” referred to then–Politburo Standing Committee member and Premier Li Keqiang. The result: Xi secured a “third term” at the 20th Congress, Li retired, and only seven months after retirement, Li suddenly died.

The rumor “Xi down, Li up” likely struck Xi hard. Someone overseas even alleged that Xi caused Li Keqiang’s death, describing the process vividly. Li’s death is indeed suspicious, and the truth remains to be uncovered.

The essence of “Xi down, Li up” is that it reflected the dissatisfaction of many toward Xi’s disastrous handling of domestic and foreign affairs—a venting of anger, a manifestation of people cursing Xi, opposing Xi, wishing for Xi’s downfall, demanding he step down, or hoping something would happen to him.

This year’s “Xi down, Zhang up” before the Fourth Plenum is very similar to the earlier “Xi down, Li up.” Zhang Youxia cannot possibly have been unaware. Since no consensus within the CCP leadership existed about “Xi stepping down,” allowing such rumors to spread would be politically disadvantageous to Zhang. He had to make a statement.

Zhang’s “praising Xi” in this article is precisely such a political statement — a way to cut himself off from the overseas narrative of “Xi down, Zhang up.”

Second, this shifts the responsibility for purging the nine generals onto Xi.

On October 17, a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense suddenly announced that nine generals — He Weidong, Miao Hua, He Hongjun, and others — were expelled from the Party and the military.

This was a political bombshell of enormous shock in the CCP political arena in 2025.

All nine were military confidants personally promoted by Xi — core members of the “Xi Army.” Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong was Xi’s No. 1 military confidant; CMC member and Director of the Political Work Department Miao Hua was Xi’s No. 2; He Hongjun had been promoted to general last July by Xi alone; Wang Xiubin was the executive deputy director of the Joint Operations Command Center; Eastern Theater Commander Lin Xiangyang was the top frontline commander for Xi’s plan to invade Taiwan; Army Political Commissar Qin Shutong and Navy Political Commissar Yuan Huazhi were “supervising officers” Xi placed next to the Navy and Army commanders; Rocket Force Commander Wang Houbin was the fourth Rocket Force commander selected by Xi after the first three collapsed; Armed Police Commander Wang Chunning was the head of the internal security forces Xi relied on for domestic stability — holding both “gun” and “knife” authority.

Who led the purge of the nine generals? From my observation of CCP practices: although Xi loudly touts “self-revolution,” it is impossible that Xi would cut off his own key military limbs, let alone remove nine top-level key figures he personally installed in crucial positions.

The purge of the nine generals was almost certainly led by CMC First Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia. After Zhang obtained evidence of their “collapse of faith,” “loss of loyalty,” “serious violation of the Party-command-of-the-gun principle and the CMC chairman responsibility system,” and corruption of “particularly huge amounts,” he presented it to Xi. Xi had no choice but to approve investigation.

By publishing the “praising Xi” article in People’s Daily, Zhang deliberately creates the impression that Xi personally directed the purge of “his own people”; while singing Xi’s praises, Zhang also places Xi directly in the “eye of the storm.”

Third, this paves the way for further purges in the military under Xi’s name.

The purge of the nine generals is not the end of the military cleanout, but only a phased result. More senior officers personally promoted by Xi are under investigation or soon will be.

For example, eighteen members of the military Central Committee who were absent from the Fourth Plenum but not yet officially purged (“double-expelled”) — fourteen of them generals:

Wang Haijiang (Western Theater), Wu Yanan (Southern Theater), Huang Ming (Northern Theater), Li Wei (Information Support Force), Wang Renhua (CMC Politics and Law Commission), Xu Xueqiang (Equipment Development), Xu Deqing (Central Theater), Ju Gansheng (Strategic Support Force), Xu Zhongbo (former Rocket Force Political Commissar), Xu Xisheng (current Rocket Force Political Commissar), Li Qiaoming (Army Commander), Hu Zhongming (Navy Commander), Liu Qingsong (Eastern Theater Political Commissar), Zhang Hongbing (Armed Police Political Commissar).

These 14 generals are currently being investigated by the military discipline commission or forced into early retirement.

Before the Fourth Plenum, rumors spread that Xi’s longtime military confidant — Zhong Shaojun, deputy director and then director of the CMC General Office for 11 years and director of Xi’s CMC Chairman Office — who had been moved to serve as Political Commissar of the National Defense University last April, had been dismissed. After the Fourth Plenum, the new political commissar of NDU was announced as Xia Zhihe, confirming Zhong’s dismissal. Whether Zhong will be investigated remains to be seen.

Before the Fourth Plenum, Xi’s military confidant — CMC General Office Director Fang Yongxiang — missed three consecutive meetings Xi held with military representatives; at the Fourth Plenum, Fang should have been promoted from alternate to full Central Committee member but was passed over. This indicates Fang is also in trouble. Whether he will be investigated remains uncertain.

On November 5, when Xi attended the commissioning ceremony of the Fujian aircraft carrier, Navy Commander Hu Zhongming, Southern Theater Commander Wu Yanan, and Political Commissar Wang Wenquan were all absent — raising suspicion that these three generals have fallen.

When a general falls, many lieutenant generals and major generals beneath him will fall as well.

For this reason, Zhang stated in his “praising Xi” article that it is necessary to “thoroughly eliminate poisonous residues and entrenched problems, resolutely prevent being ‘two-faced people’ and practicing fake loyalty.” This shows: Zhang intends to continue purging the “Xi Army” under Xi’s name.

Fourth, this is rhetoric meant to maintain the façade of unity within the CCP.

Not long after Xi secured his “third term” at the 20th Party Congress, high-level infighting erupted. With Xi’s backing, He Weidong investigated the Rocket Force, and the investigation nearly reached Zhang Youxia himself.

Zhang had served as Minister of the Equipment Development Department. His successor, Li Shangfu, was promoted to State Councilor, CMC member, and Defense Minister in 2023 — only to suddenly fall after five months. One of his charges was “bribery.”

So, to whom did Li Shangfu offer bribes? Did he bribe Zhang Youxia?

After witnessing Li Keqiang’s strange death, and after Xi forcibly removed former top leader Hu Jintao — already retired for 10 years, 80 years old, who had supported Xi and posed no threat — from the closing session of the 20th Congress, Zhang Youxia had to strike back for his own safety.

After the March 2024 “Two Sessions,” Xi’s most important military confidant — Zhong Shaojun, CMC General Office Director and chief of the CMC Chairman Office — was suddenly transferred away, moved to the National Defense University. This was likely the beginning of Zhang’s counterattack.

In July 2024, during the Third Plenum, Xi suddenly fell ill and was hospitalized. Discontented elders, princelings, and senior military officers — angry at Xi’s disastrous governance — joined forces with Zhang Youxia, turning Zhang into a key figure influencing the CCP’s political landscape.

With the fall of Xi’s No. 2 military confidant Miao Hua last November, and Xi’s No. 1 military confidant He Weidong this March, followed by a series of related high-ranking officers, Xi’s military power has effectively slipped away.

But no one wants to take responsibility for the mess created by Xi’s 13 years of catastrophic decisions — a “hot potato” too dangerous to handle.

To maintain the façade of unity, the Fourth Plenum ultimately left Xi’s top three positions unchanged, allowing him to continue performing publicly as the “Xi core.”

Zhang Youxia’s “praising Xi” article is partly for this reason as well.

Conclusion

Xi’s military arms have been broken, and his “Xi Army” has been nearly wiped out. This shows that Xi has effectively lost real power, lost authority, and can no longer “set the tone.” Today, Xi is merely an actor performing according to others’ script.

When examining CCP political developments, one must not simply look at whether Xi is being praised — that is merely official rhetoric.

Even those whom Xi favored most — He Weidong and Miao Hua — became “collapsed in faith, disloyal in loyalty,” “seriously undermining the Party-command-of-the-gun principle and the CMC chairman responsibility system.” Who can Xi still trust? Who would truly be loyal to him?

— The Dajiyuan
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