Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli Absent From Seminar — Has There Been a Change in the CCP Political Situation?

File photo of Zhang Youxia (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] On January 20, a special seminar for principal provincial- and ministerial-level leading cadres on studying and implementing the spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th CCP Central Committee opened at the Central Party School (National Academy of Governance). As usual, Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the opening ceremony. From reports by official media and footage from CCTV, it can be seen that Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia, CMC member and Chief of the Joint Staff Department Liu Zhenli, Organization Department Minister Shi Taifeng, Vice Premier He Lifeng, and former Xinjiang Party Secretary Ma Xingrui were absent. Subsequently, news circulated overseas claiming that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli had run into trouble. Are such claims true or false?

First, judging from past situations, when senior CCP officials are absent from certain important meetings or events, one possibility is that something has happened to them, another is illness, and yet another is that they have other, more important matters to attend to. Over the past year or more, Zhang Youxia on many occasions did not accompany Xi Jinping on inspection trips to Kunming, Tibet, Xinjiang, Hainan, and other places. Cai Qi also missed important meetings several times. Even Xi Jinping himself has at times been absent from important meetings. Yet afterward, all of these individuals appeared in different settings.

Second, judging whether a senior official has run into trouble based on absence from a single meeting is not sufficient, unless the absences occur repeatedly. For example, Ma Xingrui has already missed important meetings and activities multiple times, making it highly probable that something has happened to him.

So what are the reasons for the absence this time of Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, Shi Taifeng, and He Lifeng? It can be confirmed that He Lifeng was absent because he went to Switzerland to attend the Davos forum. As for the other three, if something had happened, abnormalities should have appeared in the military newspaper and official media on the 20th and 21st.

In the report on the January 20 seminar, Xi Jinping in the first paragraph emphasized the need to “steadily do all work well under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee.” The second paragraph elaborated on the CCP’s experience in governing the country, stating that “the Party has created and accumulated rich experience, including upholding the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee.” The subsequent paragraphs specifically discussed how to act in multiple areas and put forward some requirements for leadership, such as “advancing in an integrated manner the three dimensions of not daring to be corrupt, being unable to be corrupt, and not wanting to be corrupt,” and so on. But among the many provincial- and ministerial-level officials steeped in the CCP officialdom, who does not understand that these are merely official rhetoric and set phrases?

Now look at the report on the special seminar for principal provincial- and ministerial-level leading cadres on studying and implementing the spirit of the Third Plenum of the 20th CCP Central Committee, which was held on October 29, 2024. In the first paragraph, Xi emphasized “continuously pushing the study and implementation of the spirit of the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee to greater depth,” without mentioning leadership “under the Party Central Committee.” Xi’s status was still above that of other Standing Committee members, even though information had circulated after the plenum that his military authority had been weakened following a stroke.

In the report dated February 7, 2023, on the seminar for newly appointed members and alternate members of the Central Committee and principal provincial- and ministerial-level leading cadres to study the spirit of the 20th Party Congress, the first paragraph likewise did not include the words “Party Central Committee.” Xi emphasized the significance of the Chinese-style modernization theory he had proposed.

In both the 2024 and 2023 seminars held for senior officials, Xi’s speeches did not highlight the “Party Central Committee,” nor did they stress “upholding the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee.” Yet in the just-concluded seminar this point was prominently emphasized, clearly aligning with the signals continuously conveyed by officialdom after the Fourth Plenum that the CCP has already restored the Hu-era Politburo’s “centralized and unified leadership.” As provincial- and ministerial-level officials who execute top-level CCP directives, they must understand that the “Party Central Committee” now stands above Xi.

In addition to Xi conveying that even he himself must obey the directives of the “Party Central Committee,” let us also compare the wording used by the hosts of the three similar meetings.

At this year’s seminar, the host was Li Qiang. In his concluding remarks, he said Xi’s speech was “lofty in perspective, profound in intent, and inspiring,” possessing “strong political, theoretical, targeted, and guiding significance,” and so on. He also mentioned the “Two Establishes” and the “Two Upholds,” and required senior officials to “consciously unify thought and action with the important speeches of the General Secretary and the Party Central Committee’s decision-making and deployment.” Li Qiang’s remarks at the 2024 seminar were similar.

However, at the 2023 seminar, what Li Qiang mentioned was the “2442” loyalty phrase, and he said, “We must carefully study and grasp it, unify our thinking and actions with the important speeches of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and unify them with the Party Central Committee’s decision-making and deployment.” The difference lies in lowering his own position and placing Xi’s position ahead of the “Party Central Committee.”

Clearly, the signals conveyed by the reporting on the just-concluded seminar for provincial- and ministerial-level senior officials remain that the “Party Central Committee” is above Xi. If Xi had reversed the situation, both his speech and Li Qiang’s summary would have used a different set of wording.

If there has been no change at the top of the CCP, then has there been internal upheaval within the military?

On January 21, the military newspaper published a commentator article titled “Comprehensively, Profoundly, and Accurately Understand and Grasp the Strategic Deployment of the Party Central Committee,” with the subtitle indicating it was a study of Xi’s speech at the seminar for provincial- and ministerial-level leaders. In the first two paragraphs, aside from repeating Li Qiang’s stock phrases, it also stated that “we must comprehensively, profoundly, and accurately understand and grasp the strategic deployment of the Party Central Committee, and consciously unify thought and action with Chairman Xi’s important speeches.” Such phrasing tells the outside world that the “Party Central Committee” is absolutely above Chairman Xi.

At the end of the article, seemingly to avoid embarrassing Xi, it lumped together in one breath things like “Xi Thought,” “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military,” “2442,” and “implementing the responsibility system of the CMC chairman, resolutely obeying the command of the Party Central Committee, the Central Military Commission, and Chairman Xi.” When Xi’s “supreme authority” was dominant, these would absolutely have been mentioned at the very beginning. This can be seen, for example, in the first of the series of military newspaper commentator articles on the 2023 seminar.

The military newspaper commentator articles for the 2024 seminar studying the spirit of the Third Plenum were similar to this year’s. Although they did not explicitly make people feel that the “Party Central Committee” was above Xi, the downplaying of Xi was obvious. At that time, it was not long after Xi had just run into trouble.

From the reporting of official and military media, no abnormalities have appeared. The information being conveyed remains that Xi’s military and party authority has been weakened, but Zhongnanhai is still attempting to conceal it.

If there has been no change at the top of the CCP, then the likelihood that something has happened to Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli is not high, and their absence may instead be related to the Iranian crisis. A few days ago, 16 CCP military transport aircraft landed in Iran one after another. What were these military aircraft transporting? Is the CCP planning to assist Iran, or to move out evidence supporting Iran’s nuclear weapons development before a U.S. military attack? The actions of the CCP military certainly are not simple. For this reason, it would not be strange that the two, who had long since studied the spirit of the Fourth Plenum, did not attend the seminar and instead were busy with military affairs.

One more point needs to be explained: in the attendance list for this seminar, “Central Military Commission Vice Chairman” was listed separately. In the absence of Zhang Youxia, this should refer to Zhang Shengmin, simply because he has not yet been elected as a Politburo member, but as a “party and state leader” he can only be listed separately.

And would Zhang Shengmin, who has already taken down many of Xi’s confidants within the military and has already offended Xi, “betray” Zhang Youxia and re-pledge loyalty to Xi? The author believes the likelihood is not high.

Based on the above analysis, the author believes the latest rumors are not very likely. Moreover, given that Zhang Youxia’s standing within the military is far higher than Xi’s, moving against Zhang would trigger even greater turmoil within the military and would very likely backfire on Xi. Among the true and false leaks, there must be someone deliberately stirring up trouble.

(First published by People News) △