Moving Half of the Politburo to Shanghai: Xi's Greatest Concern on a Certain Day in a Certain Month

Under the bustling night scene, Shanghai is no longer what it used to be! (Video Screenshot)

[People News] On April 30, Xi Jinping attended a symposium in Shanghai focused on strengthening basic research. This marks his second trip away from Beijing since his visit to the Xiong'an New Area in Hebei on March 25.

At first glance, it seems that Xi is placing significant emphasis on enhancing basic research, as he made a special trip from Beijing to Shanghai for this symposium. However, beneath the surface of this event, I perceive that Xi's primary concern continues to be security issues.

Why do I say this? There are three reasons:

First, the unusually high level of attendance at the meeting.

A total of 9 members of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China were present at this symposium, including Xi Jinping, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, Shi Taifeng, Zhang Guoqing, Liu Guozhong, Chen Jining, Yin Li, and Huang Kunming. Among them, Xi, Cai, and Ding are members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

Xi serves as the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, President of the State, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Cai Qi is the Secretary of the Central Secretariat and Director of the General Office, while Ding Xuexiang is the Executive Vice Premier of the State Council. All three are top national-level officials.

Shi Taifeng is the Minister of the Organisation Department, Zhang Guoqing and Liu Guozhong are Vice Premiers of the State Council, Chen Jining is the Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee, Yin Li is the Secretary of the Beijing Municipal Committee, and Huang Kunming is the Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee. Shi, Zhang, Liu, Chen, Yin, and Huang are all deputy national-level officials.

This symposium is merely related to scientific and technological work, and strengthening basic research is just one aspect of that work. The meeting's nature falls under 'investigation and research,' and there is no necessity for such a large number of high-ranking officials to attend. Nevertheless, Xi has brought nearly half of the Politburo to Shanghai.

The 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China consists of 23 members, and to date, 3 have been purged: Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, and Ma Xingrui, leaving 20 remaining members. Notably, 9 of them attended a recent symposium in Shanghai.

Why did Xi Jinping bring so many Politburo members to Shanghai?

One possible explanation is that on January 24, Zhang Youxia, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, along with Liu Zhenli, a member of the Central Military Commission and Chief of Staff of the Joint Staff Department, were officially announced to have fallen from grace. Consequently, Xi has become isolated within the military, feeling insecure and needing the presence of several Political Bureau members to boost his confidence and simultaneously assert his 'official authority'.

Xi's choice to bring so many Political Bureau members with him to Shanghai for this meeting is a clear violation of the 'Eight Regulations' he personally established, which require leading cadres to conduct investigations and research with a 'light vehicle and simple entourage'. This exemplifies 'formalism' and 'bureaucratism'.

Given that the three Political Bureau members from Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangdong attended the meeting, it raises the question of why the two Political Bureau members from Tianjin and Chongqing—Tianjin Municipal Party Secretary Chen Min'er and Chongqing Municipal Party Secretary Yuan Jiajun—were absent.

It is likely that Xi does not feel comfortable with Chen and Yuan.

Chen Min'er has been rumoured to be a potential successor to Xi. Xi aims to maintain his rule indefinitely and has not yet designated a successor. Individuals who were once seen as potential successors, such as Sun Zhengcai, a member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Committee, and Hu Chunhua, a member of the Political Bureau and Vice Premier of the State Council, have either faced investigations by Xi or have been marginalised. Xi is particularly sensitive and dismissive towards those rumoured to be his potential successors.

Yuan Jiajun and the recently ousted member of the Communist Party of China's Politburo, Ma Xingrui, had a superior-subordinate relationship at the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, with a connection that lasted over a decade. Following Ma Xingrui's arrest, he may reveal issues concerning Yuan Jiajun. Xi may regard Yuan differently.

Secondly, the meeting was rather dull.

According to reports from the Central Television of the Communist Party of China, during the symposium, Xi sat on the podium, listening to participants read their prepared statements; once they finished, Xi delivered an 'important speech' from a script as well.

There were no images of Xi shaking hands with the meeting representatives, no photos of him posing with them, and no interactions captured between Xi and the representatives.

Throughout the event, Xi maintained a serious demeanour, while other senior officials also appeared stern, and the meeting representatives looked solemn. The entire symposium was entirely formulaic, the language adhered to party rhetoric, and the applause was mechanical.

Why was such a high-profile meeting so tedious?

I believe Xi's focus is not on strengthening basic research at all. His trip to Shanghai was merely a political performance for external audiences.

On January 24, the sudden announcement of the ousting of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli was one of the most shocking actions taken by Xi among many notable moves since the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

In 2022, during the closing session of the 20th National Congress, Xi ordered the forcible removal of Hu Jintao, the former top leader of the Communist Party, government, and military, who was 80 years old, had been retired for a decade, had provided significant support to Xi, and posed no threat to his power, all in front of the cameras of international mainstream media, leaving the entire Communist Party establishment in shock.

In 2026, Xi Jinping captured Zhang Youxia, the first general of the People's Liberation Army, who is part of the 'red second generation,' has served on the battlefield, achieved military honors, is now 75 years old, is set to retire next year, plays a crucial role in supporting Xi's bid for a third term, holds the highest actual prestige in the military, has decades of friendship with the Xi family, and is the only one capable of engaging in dialogue with international military counterparts. This move not only sends chills through the entire CCP officialdom but also makes every senior official around Xi feel extremely uneasy.

Xi's arrests of Zhang and Liu have led to instability in military morale, party unity, and public trust.

Observers, both domestic and international, are closely monitoring the stability of Xi's power and position within the CCP. Since the arrests of Zhang and Liu, Xi has not left the country even once, has been hesitant to leave Beijing for an extended period, and has refrained from visiting and comforting the troops and officers in the field.

More than three months after Xi's arrests of Zhang and Liu, perhaps to project an image of having everything under control, Xi chose to make a public appearance in Shanghai, which resulted in this symposium.

Despite the symposium, Xi appeared very tense, showing no signs of a smile, which created a heavy atmosphere throughout the venue.

Additionally, aside from attending this symposium, there have been no reports of any other public activities during Xi's trip to Shanghai.

Xi attended the symposium on strengthening basic research in Shanghai, a major technology hub in China, home to many research institutions and numerous experts and scholars engaged in basic research. Logically, Xi should have visited relevant research institutions and met with some renowned scholars in the field. However, no such reports have emerged.

This year, Xi Jinping made a rare visit to Beijing, arriving in China's largest city, which the Communist Party describes as the 'international centre for economy, finance, trade, shipping, technological innovation, and a cultural metropolis.' He should have listened to the work reports from the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and the municipal government. However, no such reports were made.

Xi's visit to Shanghai coincided with the eve of 'May Day Labour Day.' As a public relations gesture, he could have taken this opportunity to visit and comfort model workers and recipients of the May Day Labour Medal. However, there were no such reports.

Additionally, Xi's visit coincided with the eve of 'May Fourth Youth Day.' To show his concern for young students, he could have toured Fudan University or Shanghai Jiao Tong University, offering encouragement to the youth in their pursuit of Xi's 'Chinese Dream.' However, there were no such reports.

As the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, after dealing with Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, if Xi had truly managed to resolve the situation with them, he could have used his visit to Shanghai to inspect the troops and meet with military representatives stationed there, thereby demonstrating his control over the military. However, there were no such reports.

Why did Xi's visit to Shanghai conclude with him merely reading a script at a seminar on strengthening basic research, without any further activities?

The most likely reason is that after the sudden capture of Zhang and Liu, Xi is constantly worried that someone might attempt a similar surprise attack against him.

To this day, it seems that Xi has not fully dealt with Zhang and Liu.

On January 24, after the Xi administration announced that Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were under investigation for serious disciplinary violations, the following day, they published an editorial in the military newspaper, accusing Zhang and Liu of 'five serious' crimes, attempting to 'hit them with a single blow.'

However, to date, the entire military has not witnessed a surge of loyalty expressing 'resolute support' for Xi Jinping's ousting of Zhang and Liu, nor have local officials demonstrated such loyalty. The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress has convened three meetings, yet Zhang and Liu's roles as national representatives remain intact, and none of their positions have been altered so far.

Both Zhang and Liu are career military officers, with Zhang serving for 58 years and Liu for 43 years, having climbed the ranks from the very bottom. They have both seen combat and are among the few generals in the upper echelons of the Communist Party's military with real battlefield experience. Their former subordinates are widespread throughout the military. Xi's abrupt move against Zhang and Liu has not only left them dissatisfied, but many of their former subordinates in the military also harbour discontent towards Xi.

After Xi arrived in Shanghai, he made a brief appearance at this symposium before quietly withdrawing from public view. Ultimately, it is Xi who seems to lack a sense of security.

Conclusion

Since Xi took office 14 years ago, under the pretext of anti-corruption and 'tiger hunting,' he has carried out successive purges in both the military and local governments, offending a significant number of high-ranking officials, particularly senior military leaders.

There is a Chinese saying, 'to weave a cocoon to bind oneself.'

Xi has targeted too many individuals and created too many enemies, ultimately confining himself in a 'cage' filled with adversaries. What Xi fears most is that on a certain day, someone might 'return the favour in kind.'

--The Dajiyuan
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