The Misfortunes of Eight CCP Chiefs of the (General) Staff

March 11, 2023: Senior members of the CCP’s Central Military Commission line up to take the oath at the National People’s Congress. From right to left: Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Li Shangfu, Liu Zhenli, Miao Hua, Zhang Shengmin. (Lintao Zhang/Getty Images)

[People News] On January 24, a spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that Zhang Youxia, a member of the CCP Politburo and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Liu Zhenli, a member of the CMC and Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department, were “suspected of serious violations of discipline and law” and had been placed under case-filing review.

This is the most explosive major event to occur in the CCP political arena since China entered 2026.

I have already written an article about the life-and-death ordeals of eight CMC vice chairmen in CCP history. Here, I will provide a brief review and summary of the misfortunes that befell eight Chiefs of the (General) Staff in CCP history.

I. Su Yu was purged, suffering both illness and misery.

Su Yu was one of the CCP’s most capable battlefield commanders. When the CCP conferred military ranks in 1955, Su Yu ranked first among the ten “Great Generals” (dajiang). The three Great Generals and twenty-six full generals awarded ranks in 1955 had all once served under him. Su Yu’s military achievements were surpassed only by Marshal Lin Biao.

Su Yu was the second Chief of the General Staff after the CCP took power (Oct. 1954–Oct. 1958).

After the Central Military Commission was reestablished in September 1954, Mao Zedong became CMC Chairman, with several members beneath him; the top-ranked member was Marshal Peng Dehuai. Peng was effectively a vice chairman, overseeing the CMC’s daily work. That same month, the State Council established the Ministry of National Defense, with Peng serving concurrently as Vice Premier and Defense Minister.

In 1958, Mao suddenly launched the “anti-dogmatism” campaign within the military. Su Yu was struck down in this political storm and remained frustrated and sidelined for decades.

On the surface, this “anti-dogmatism” campaign opposed mechanically copying Soviet military practices; in reality, Mao feared that Chinese marshals and generals might become entangled in coup politics like Soviet Marshal Zhukov.

In the mass criticism campaign, Su Yu was denounced as an “extreme individualist against the Party and against leadership,” accused of “demanding power from the Party,” “demanding power from the Ministry of National Defense,” and “complaining to foreigners,” among other charges.

Su Yu was famously low-key; there were sayings about him “yielding the command twice” and “yielding the marshal’s rank once.” It made little sense to label him an “extreme individualist.”

As for claims that he “wanted power,” “seized power,” or “complained to foreigners,” they were even more baseless. After the Ministry of National Defense was established, orders and directives that had previously been issued in the name of the CMC and headquarters were required to be reissued under the Defense Ministry’s signature—but there were no clear rules on which documents must carry the Defense Ministry name and which need not. When Su Yu handled such documents, he was criticized if he did not sign in the Defense Ministry’s name, and criticized if he did.

For this reason, Su Yu asked that the responsibilities of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff be clearly defined so daily work could follow established rules. On March 16, 1955, the CMC accepted Su Yu’s suggestion and ordered the General Staff to draft regulations defining their respective duties. But the General Staff revised the draft five times and still could not get it approved.

In November 1957, when Su Yu visited the Soviet Union, he asked the Soviet Chief of the General Staff—so as to learn from Soviet experience—for a written document outlining the “work responsibilities of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff” for reference. This was denounced as “complaining to foreigners” and “colluding with foreign countries.”

Su Yu wrote one self-criticism after another, yet still could not pass political scrutiny. In the end, he reluctantly accepted all the accusations and “confessed” to every alleged offense just to barely get through.

On August 31, 1958, the CCP Politburo passed a decision to “remove Su Yu from the post of Chief of the General Staff” and decided that his “errors” would be orally conveyed down to the regiment level in the military and to the prefectural Party committee level in local government.

Su Yu’s wife, Chu Qing, summarized it this way: Su Yu fought bitterly in wartime, was bitterly persecuted in peacetime, and suffered bitterly from illness in old age. He followed the CCP “revolution” for 60 years, spending 30 of them in adversity.

II. Huang Kecheng was purged and could not be rehabilitated for 18 years.

After Su Yu was brought down, Mao promoted Huang Kecheng—who had “made revolution” with him since the Jinggangshan days—to be Chief of the General Staff.

Huang took office in October 1958, but less than a year later, in the summer of 1959, he was purged.

On July 14, 1959, at the Lushan Conference, Peng Dehuai wrote Mao a candid letter reflecting his views on problems since the 1958 Great Leap Forward. Mao was furious.

Mao decided to bring down Peng Dehuai. For that purpose, he specifically summoned Huang Kecheng—then in Beijing managing the CMC’s daily affairs—to Lushan. In the words of Mao supporter and Vice Premier Tan Zhenlin, Mao was “moving in reinforcements.”

But after arriving at Lushan, Huang not only failed to serve as Mao’s “reinforcement”—he became Peng’s supporter. At the July 19 meeting, Huang spoke for two hours, backing Peng’s views.

This angered Mao. On July 30, Mao spoke with Huang Kecheng, Zhou Xiaozhou, Li Rui, and others. Mao pinned three labels on Huang: first, Peng Dehuai’s “political chief of staff”; second, the leading figure of a “Hunan clique”; third, a key member of a “military club.”

Huang did not submit. He rebutted Mao point by point. He said: “My views are basically consistent with Peng Dehuai’s—but only regarding the opinions at this Lushan meeting. In the past I argued with Peng many times; when we differed, we argued… but our arguments did not hurt our feelings… I believe our relationship is normal.”

“I became Peng’s chief of staff because Chairman Mao—you—wanted me to be. I was working in Hunan and did not want to come; you insisted I come. Since I became chief of staff, how could politics and military affairs be separated? Peng’s letter was written on the mountain, and I had not yet arrived—how could I have been his chief of staff in writing that ‘opinion letter’?”

“I worked in Hunan for many years. If I met the Hunan leadership a few more times, talked a bit more, cared more about Hunan’s work, how does that become a ‘Hunan clique’? As for a ‘military club’—where does that even come from?”

After that, Mao repeatedly tried to persuade Huang to stand with him. Other central leaders also pressured Huang. In the end, Huang had to admit against his conscience that he had committed an anti-Party error.

The result of the Lushan Conference: Huang Kecheng was labeled a member of Peng Dehuai’s “anti-Party clique,” and his Chief of the General Staff position was removed.

Huang was not rehabilitated until December 1978—nearly 20 years after being purged.

III. Luo Ruiqing was purged and driven to jump from a building in an attempted suicide.

After Huang Kecheng fell, Mao appointed Luo Ruiqing as Chief of the General Staff and Secretary-General of the CMC. But in December 1965, Luo was also brought down.

Why was Luo purged? Because Mao was preparing a grand strategy: launching the Cultural Revolution, carrying out “continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat,” and overthrowing anyone he thought might threaten his power.

Mao’s greatest fear in launching the Cultural Revolution was a coup. Who was most likely to stage one? Those who held the “gun barrel” (military power) and the “knife handle” (security and legal power).

Luo had served as Minister of Public Security for 10 years, holding the “knife handle” for a decade; as Chief of the General Staff and CMC Secretary-General for 6 years, holding the “gun barrel” for six.

As Chief of the General Staff and CMC Secretary-General, Luo tried to create achievements and appeared relatively strong. His rank was Great General, and he sometimes showed insufficient respect toward marshals; marshals often complained about him to Lin Biao and Mao, heightening Mao’s vigilance. Luo was also relatively close to Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping—who were running day-to-day work at the center—making Mao even more uneasy.

After weighing it, Mao decided to make Luo the target, ending Luo’s political life to “strike the mountain and shake the tiger.”

In December 1965, Mao convened the Shanghai Conference and launched a sudden attack on Luo, accusing him of opposing Lin Biao, failing to “put politics in command,” and seeking to seize power. Luo was removed as Chief of the General Staff and CMC Secretary-General.

In March–April 1966, Mao ordered Marshal Ye Jianying to chair the Jingxi Hotel Conference, which continued criticizing Luo for 35 days, thoroughly destroying him. In despair, Luo jumped from a building in an attempted suicide, but did not die—he was seriously injured.

The meeting’s final conclusion labeled Luo as “attempting to seize military power.” Luo was removed from his posts as CCP Secretariat member and State Council Vice Premier.

From May 4 to May 26, 1966, the enlarged Politburo meeting in Beijing approved the notice launching the Cultural Revolution. Luo was labeled a member of the “Peng–Luo–Lu–Yang anti-Party clique,” and from then on he was imprisoned.

Luo was not released from detention until November 1973—nearly 8 years of persecution.

IV. Yang Chengwu persecuted others harshly, and was himself purged for 6 years.

After Luo Ruiqing fell, Mao appointed Yang Chengwu as Acting Chief of the General Staff. For a time—especially in 1967—Yang was among Mao’s most favored figures; Yang accompanied Mao on inspection tours, and many important Mao instructions were conveyed by Yang.

But the good times did not last. In 1968, Yang Chengwu was also brought down.

Yang’s wife once said to him: “Your position is clearly stuck in a crack: you have to listen to the Chairman and also to Lin Biao; you have to listen to the Premier and the old marshals, and also to Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing and the Cultural Revolution group. Look at Luo Ruiqing—pressed from all sides, you become the sacrifice.”

This had some truth—but Yang was not innocent.

When Mao brought down Luo Ruiqing, Yang Chengwu was a spearhead. At the Jingxi Hotel Conference in March 1966, Yang criticized Luo as worthless. Yang said Luo “is an ambitious schemer and hypocrite, an extremely dangerous element in our Party and our military”; “a person who most likes and is best at lying, fabricating rumors, sowing discord, and denying responsibility—he has become addicted to lying, and the circumstances are extremely vile”; Luo “opposes Mao Zedong Thought, opposes the Chairman’s military line, promotes the bourgeois military line,” “usurps the military and opposes the Party,” and “plots a counterrevolutionary coup.” It was a stance aimed at destroying Luo completely.

After becoming acting Chief of the General Staff, Yang at one point served as Mao’s messenger. But as his wife said, he was squeezed between Mao (the supreme commander) and Lin Biao (the deputy commander), between Zhou Enlai and the old marshals and Cultural Revolution new elites like Jiang Qing. One misstep could doom him.

And so it did. In 1968, Zong Sumei—wife of Shan Shichong, secretary to Air Force political commissar Yu Lijin—reported to the Air Force Party committee office that Shan Shichong had an improper relationship with Yang Yi, who worked at the Air Force Daily. Yang Yi was Yang Chengwu’s daughter.

A conflict arose among Yang Chengwu, Yu Lijin, and Air Force commander Wu Faxian over how to handle the matter. Wu Faxian had support from Lin Biao and Ye Qun. Lin had Ye Qun report to Mao, and Mao sided with Lin.

Mao held four meetings and ultimately decided on March 22, 1968: Yang was removed as acting Chief of the General Staff and stripped of all his posts in the CMC; Yu Lijin and Beijing Garrison commander Fu Chongbi were also brought down.

Yang did not return to public life until 1974—six years after being purged.

V. Huang Yongsheng was sentenced to 18 years in prison.

After Yang Chengwu was removed on March 22, 1968, Mao appointed Huang Yongsheng—who had “made revolution” with him since the 1927 Autumn Harvest Uprising—as Chief of the General Staff. Zhou Enlai informed Huang, who tried to decline; Zhou told him to see Lin Biao. Huang went to Lin, who produced Mao’s written instruction. Huang had nothing to say and had to take the post.

Huang Yongsheng’s original name was Huang Xuquan. Because he fought bravely alongside Mao, Mao rewarded him and renamed him Huang Yongsheng, encouraging him to “win forever.” Huang indeed won many battles in his military career. In 1955, Mao conferred on him the rank of full general.

For a period as Chief of the General Staff, Mao still trusted Huang. After Yang Chengwu fell, the CMC Working Group replaced the CMC Standing Committee; Huang became the group leader. With Lin Biao as first vice chairman, Huang worked under Lin’s direct leadership and naturally had more contact with Lin.

After the 1969 Ninth Party Congress, Mao and Lin increasingly diverged over how to treat the Cultural Revolution. Lin grew tired of endless elite infighting and hoped to end the Cultural Revolution, develop production, and stabilize politics; Mao was determined to pursue “continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat.” A clash was unavoidable.

After the 1970 Lushan meeting, Mao began preparing to bring down Lin Biao.

Lin had long been ill and could not endure prolonged struggle. Not wanting to be tortured to death like Liu Shaoqi, Lin “fled” on September 13, 1971, and died in a plane crash at Öndörkhaan in Mongolia.

After Lin’s death, Huang Yongsheng, Wu Faxian, Qiu Huizuo, and Li Zuopeng were placed under “isolated investigation” as Lin’s “diehard followers.”

On January 25, 1981, Huang Yongsheng was sentenced to 18 years in prison by the CCP Supreme Court’s Special Tribunal as a principal culprit in the “Lin Biao counterrevolutionary clique.”

In his later years, Huang looked back and said: “Plotting to assassinate the Chairman, armed coup, fleeing south to Guangzhou—these things don’t fit Lin Biao’s personality. I truly could not understand.”

On April 26, 1983, before his death, Huang Yongsheng’s last words were: “I request the central authorities to rehabilitate me… I did not oppose the Party… I… did not oppose the Chairman!”

VI. Deng Xiaoping returned, then was purged again.

In 1966, when Mao launched the Cultural Revolution, the two biggest officials he sought to bring down were State Chairman Liu Shaoqi and CCP General Secretary Deng Xiaoping. Liu and Deng were labeled the two heads of the “bourgeois headquarters.”

After Liu and Deng were toppled, Mao treated them differently: Liu was persecuted to death, while Deng kept his Party membership. After struggle sessions and self-criticisms, Deng was sent in 1969 to work at a tractor repair factory in Jiangxi.

After Lin Biao’s 1971 death, Deng immediately wrote Mao, first pledging support, second admitting fault, and third hoping to come out and do some work.

After repeated consideration, Mao allowed Deng to return to work. In 1973, Deng returned to Beijing as a State Council Vice Premier again.

In 1975, at Mao’s suggestion, Deng became a Politburo Standing Committee member, CCP Vice Chairman, CMC Vice Chairman, and Chief of the General Staff.

Mao believed he had done two great things: defeating Chiang Kai-shek and launching the Cultural Revolution. Deng had been brought down at the start of the Cultural Revolution. How Deng would treat the Cultural Revolution after his return was one of Mao’s central concerns. Mao wanted Deng to lead a resolution on the Cultural Revolution with an overall evaluation of “70% achievements, 30% errors.” Deng used the excuse “I am a person from Peach Blossom Spring,” and “I do not know of Han, let alone Wei and Jin,” to dodge the task, displeasing Mao.

Mao’s liaison Mao Yuanxin repeatedly told Mao that Deng was unwilling to affirm the Cultural Revolution and even intended to reverse verdicts. Mao became increasingly dissatisfied with Deng.

In the winter of 1975, Mao launched the “Criticize Deng, Counterattack the Right-Deviationist Reversal Trend” campaign. On April 5, 1976, Beijing saw the “April Fifth Movement,” labeled a “counterrevolutionary incident,” with Deng seen as the ultimate backstage instigator. On April 7, Mao proposed removing Deng from all posts while retaining Party membership; Deng was purged again.

VII. Fang Fenghui was sentenced to life imprisonment.

In 2015, after Xi Jinping launched military reforms, the former General Staff Department was dismantled and the Joint Staff Department was created; Fang Fenghui became the first Chief of Staff after the reforms.

Fang was once seen as a “bright star of enormous influence in the military”: in 2007, at age 56, he was promoted to commander of the Beijing Military Region, the youngest commander among the seven military regions; in 2009, for the PRC’s 60th anniversary parade, he served as parade commander-in-chief; the following year he was promoted to full general; before the 2012 18th Party Congress, breaking the precedent that the prior five Beijing Military Region commanders retired in place, he was elevated directly to Chief of the General Staff; in 2015 he became the first Chief of Staff of the post-reform Joint Staff Department.

Had nothing unexpected happened, with such momentum Fang likely would have “moved up another level” at the 19th Party Congress, becoming a Politburo member and CMC vice chairman.

But in August 2017, Fang Fenghui fell for serious corruption.

On February 20, 2019, Xinhua reported that Fang Fenghui, convicted of bribery, offering bribes, and possessing unexplained enormous assets, was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The surface reason was corruption; the true reason may have been that Fang was promoted by former Politburo member and CMC vice chairman Guo Boxiong—Fang was Guo’s confidant, not Xi’s. After Guo was investigated, Fang outwardly supported Xi, but may have harbored anti-Xi speech or actions in private.

VIII. Liu Zhenli was placed under case-filing review.

Like Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli is among the few PLA full generals who fought in the Sino-Vietnamese War and earned combat merit.

He rose step by step from cadet to platoon leader and company commander. In 2014 he became commander of the CCP’s “ace unit,” the 38th Group Army. In July 2015 he became Chief of Staff of the Armed Police; by the end of that year, Chief of Staff of the Army. In June 2021 he became Commander of the Army; at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 he became a CMC member; in March 2023 he became Chief of Staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department.

Why exactly Liu Zhenli was placed under case-filing review is hard to know, because Xi’s handling of senior military investigations has become a black box. Xi’s side claims that Liu, together with Zhang Youxia, committed “seven major crimes” including “seriously trampling and undermining the CMC chairman responsibility system,” but provides no evidence.

At present, Xi’s case-filing review of Zhang and Liu has lasted only 13 days; the truth remains to be uncovered.

Conclusion

During Mao’s 27 years in power, there were seven Chiefs of the General Staff. The first, Xu Xiangqian, did not perform the role due to illness, with Nie Rongzhen acting for a period. At that time, the Korean War had erupted and Mao was preoccupied with fighting; Xu and Nie were not purged. The subsequent six Chiefs of the General Staff were all purged.

After Xi came to power and returned toward the Mao era, there have been three Chiefs of Staff so far—two have fallen.

Mao inherited the CCP ancestor Marx’s “philosophy of struggle,” fighting Heaven, Earth, and Man, finding endless joy in struggle. Xi wants to be a second Mao Zedong, never forgetting the word “struggle.” Since taking office, he has struggled in a way that turns the world upside down—life and death combat.

Now, among the seven current CMC members headed by Xi, Xi has ordered five taken down, including two vice chairmen. If Xi keeps struggling like this, who is safe? No one is safe.

— The Dajiyuan
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