On December 4, 2024, Xi Jinping, accompanied by members of the Central Military Commission (CMC), visited the headquarters of the newly established Information Support Force in Beijing.
[People News] On March 7, Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping attended the full meeting of the military delegation at the Fourth Session of the 14th National People’s Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The number of top military officials from the Central Military Commission accompanying him at his side dropped directly from 6 in 2023, to 4 in 2024 and 2025, and then to just 1. If Xi was not embarrassed, then the embarrassed ones were the officers at all levels across the entire military. Unlike previous years, when he was concerned with the military’s combat capability and strategic development, this year Xi placed particular emphasis on “political army-building.”
In the very first paragraph of the state media report, it said that during the “15th Five-Year Plan” period, in advancing the modernization of national defense and the military, “it is necessary to uphold well, apply well, and develop well the important magic weapon of political army-building, … and give full play to the unique advantages of political army-building.” In its more detailed explanation, it further emphasized that there must absolutely not be anyone in the military “harboring divided loyalties toward the Party,” and that “the Party must manage the military, manage cadres, and manage the sector.” As for military combat capability and strategic development, Xi mentioned very little.
As for the six reports delivered by military representatives, they respectively focused on “cross-military-and-local law-enforcement coordination, Party organization leadership in scientific research breakthroughs, cultivation of sergeant talent, capability generation and application of new equipment and new forces, promoting fine traditions, model cultivation, propaganda, study, and application,” all of which highlighted political aspects and had little to do with military combat capability or strategic development.
This shows that after round after round of purges in the military, especially after Xi removed numerous generals including Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Central Military Commission Chief of Staff Liu Zhenli, both of whom had real combat experience and paid attention to military strategic development, Xi is now more concerned with the military’s loyalty to himself and more concerned with whether he can firmly control military power. Because after Zhang and Liu were arrested, the negative reaction within the military had already made Xi feel a chill. Xi cannot guarantee how many people in the military will actually be loyal to him. Moreover, Zhang and Liu, who were criticized for “seriously trampling on the responsibility system of the chairman of the Central Military Commission,” still remain National People’s Congress deputies, showing that the constraints Xi faces within the Party and the military truly do exist, and that undercurrents within the military are still surging.
Before a new round of purges, and before he can ensure that he has gained a relatively high degree of loyalty from the military, Xi is highly unlikely to continue pursuing his ambition of using force against Taiwan, and will not give any military personnel an opportunity to challenge him by force. What Xi’s thinking reveals is that he still has not gained genuine loyalty from top to bottom in the military, still does not have the confidence to fully take back military power, and that his repeated emphasis on loyalty shows that inwardly he is quite anxious and very lacking in confidence. This kind of anxiety had not been seen at the Two Sessions over the previous three years.
On March 7, 2025, when Xi participated in the full meeting of the military delegation at the National People’s Congress, what he emphasized was how to implement the requirements of high-quality development, how to face challenges in military development, and how to resolve problems in development. The themes of the reports delivered by military representatives revolved around “coordinating weapon and equipment testing and evaluation resources, innovating planning and execution management, improving the efficiency of fund use and management, strengthening military-industrial production-capacity support, advancing the construction of national defense positions and engineering projects, and making good use of resources in emerging fields,” none of which had anything to do with political army-building.
If Xi’s focus at the 2025 Two Sessions military delegation meeting was on military development, and if that was related to rumors that Zhang Youxia actually controlled the military, then in 2024 and 2023, when Xi was still “the one supreme authority,” he still did not mention political army-building when attending the military delegation meeting.
At the full military meeting on March 7, 2024, Xi said that “strategic capabilities in emerging fields are an important component of the national strategic system and capabilities,” and called for “deepening reform and innovation and comprehensively enhancing strategic capabilities in emerging fields.” What he spoke of in concrete terms was all about how to innovate and how to develop. At that time, the themes of the speeches by military representatives were respectively “construction of maritime situational awareness capability, improving cyber-space defense capability, promoting the application of artificial intelligence, strengthening the coordinated management and use of space resources, strengthening the standardization and generalization of emerging fields, and innovating the construction of unmanned combat forces,” all of which were related to Chinese Communist Party military strength and strategic development.
At the full military meeting on March 8, 2023, Xi proposed “consolidating and enhancing the integrated national strategic system and capabilities” and how to do so. The speeches Xi listened to from the military representatives concerned “national laboratory construction, national defense science and technology industry capacity building, coordinated construction of major infrastructure, national reserve construction, border and coastal defense work, and national defense education for all the people,” all of which were related to the Chinese Communist Party military’s building of an integrated national strategic system.
Clearly, because in 2023 and 2024 Xi did not yet lack loyalty from top to bottom within the military, he was more concerned with military combat capability and whether it could satisfy his ambition to use force against Taiwan. As for political army-building, Xi mainly raised it in relation to the military leadership at the Party-building conference held in July 2023 and at the Central Military Commission political work conference in June 2024, which was most likely related to the Rocket Force leak incident.
At the Central Military Commission political work conference, Xi said, “At present, the world situation, the national situation, the Party situation, and the military situation are all undergoing complex and profound changes, and our military is facing intertwined and complicated political tests. We must firmly grasp the requirements of the times for political army-building and push political army-building forward without pause,” that “political work is forever the lifeline of our military,” and that “grasping ideological leadership is the foundation for grasping all leadership.” He also specifically emphasized that “senior cadres must put themselves into it, bring out the courage to cast aside face, expose shortcomings and ugliness, profoundly reflect with an attitude of digging deep into the roots and touching the soul, seriously rectify problems, solve the root problem in thinking, and push political army-building deeper and more solidly.”
However, Xi’s “accident” at the Chinese Communist Party’s Third Plenary Session caused the purge of the top military leadership to pause. The change in military power, along with the investigation one after another of Central Military Commission members and numerous generals whom Xi had promoted, also forced Xi to lie low quietly and wait for an opportunity to bring down Zhang and Liu and regain the highest power in the military. But his move in violation of Chinese Communist Party rules also brought him criticism and resistance within the Party and the military.
Now, Xi and top officials such as Li Qiang have once again emphasized political army-building at the Two Sessions. This not only foreshadows a new round of purges in the military, but also indicates that Xi can govern the military only by relying on those political-work personnel in the military who want to climb upward, and these are the very people least welcomed within the armed forces. Could this produce the opposite effect and trigger a mutiny by those military men who support Zhang and Liu and still have some backbone in their bones? Especially at a time when Iran and Cuba are on the verge of political change.
(First published by [People News]) △
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