Xi Jinping's New Era of Going Up the Mountain and Down to the Countryside: University Students Returning to Vocational Schools

A graduate from a “985” top university breaks down in tears, saying she can’t find a job. (Video screenshot)

[People News] In the spring of 2026, regions such as Beijing, Shandong, and Anhui introduced the 'University Student Technician Class', encouraging undergraduate and master's graduates to return to vocational schools for full-time studies lasting 1-2 years. The tuition fees are in the tens of thousands of yuan, and graduates receive certificates along with job recommendations. This initiative quickly popularised the term 'Returning to School for a Degree', with official media heavily promoting the notion that 'skill certificates equate to competitiveness'.

According to official data from the Communist Party of China, the youth unemployment rate surged to 16.9% in March. At first glance, this seems to be a practical response from university students opting for 'further education', but at its core, it serves as yet another cover for the systemic issues, a desperate reaction to the declining employment rate.

The employment anxiety among university students highlights serious macroeconomic problems. Instead of addressing economic recovery and job creation, the situation has been oversimplified to mean 'shedding formal attire and entering vocational schools'. This trend reflects the Communist Party's crude manipulation to evade accountability, as well as a quick fix for fabricating employment statistics. By postponing employment for two years, the data can still be counted in that year's employment rate for graduates, a clever accounting manoeuvre, but the burden falls on the youth.

With 12.7 million university graduates, even if half of them return to vocational schools, this significant movement can be seen as Xi Jinping's New Era of the Up the Mountain and Down to the Countryside Movement.

The imbalance in macroeconomic data reveals an employment black hole exacerbated by inflated growth rates.

In the first quarter of 2026, China's GDP growth rate was officially reported at 5.0%. However, various data points reveal a state of structural imbalance. The national per capita disposable income stood at 12,782 yuan, reflecting a nominal year-on-year increase of 4.9%, and a real growth of 4.0% after adjusting for price factors. Both urban and rural incomes grew by 3.2%, trailing GDP growth by 1.8 percentage points. In terms of consumption, the per capita consumption expenditure of residents, which is a key indicator of everyday consumer spending, recorded a real growth rate of only 2.6% in the first quarter, falling short of the GDP growth rate by 2.4%.

These data points paint a picture of the Chinese economy characterised by significant 'tension': while economic growth is robust, resident income is growing at a moderate pace, and consumer spending is stagnating. Moody's analysis indicates that the 5% year-on-year growth in China's first quarter provides a reassuring headline figure, but a deeper look reveals an economy struggling to find a balanced footing, with domestic demand remaining the weakest link.

This raises the question: how did GDP increase? The answer lies in substantial government investment and consumption expenditure. This year, the Chinese Communist Party has set a historic high fiscal deficit rate of 4%, with national general public budget expenditures exceeding 30 trillion yuan for the first time, alongside the issuance of 1.3 trillion yuan in ultra-long-term special government bonds. Official data shows that in the first quarter, the issuance of local government bonds increased by 9.3% year-on-year.

Now, turning to the youth unemployment rate, which reached 16.9% in March, marking a four-month high. However, it is widely believed that the actual rate for the 16-24 age group is even higher, estimated between 46.5% and 50%. This year, there are 12.7 million college graduates, an increase of 480,000 from last year, resulting in unprecedented employment pressure.

China's GDP fails to create job opportunities, generate wealth for residents, or foster consumption scenarios. Instead, it produces a plethora of appealing yet meaningless and often contradictory data. Additionally, it serves to extend the terms of officials.

Industries are increasingly embroiled in fierce competition, with the education sector expanding enrollment at an alarming rate.

Following the collapse of the real estate market, household wealth has plummeted, resulting in millions of job losses across related industries. Various sectors are engaged in a frenzied competition, with ride-hailing jobs dropping to 1.5 yuan per kilometre, yielding only about a hundred yuan a day. The employment pool for food delivery and courier services is nearing saturation. By 2025, food delivery platforms are expected to enter a large-scale subsidy war, where each platform will need to subsidise 2 yuan for every 1 yuan increase in revenue. This subsidy war exacerbates profit pressures across society, with nearly 70% of restaurant businesses reporting a decline in revenue and almost 80% experiencing a drop in net profits, leading to a significant number of physical restaurants shutting down. While resident consumption remains weak, the savings rate has surged to over 35%. Young people are hesitant to spend and reluctant to start families, private enterprises are contracting, and employment expectations are trapped in a vicious cycle.

Simultaneously, there has been an unexpected increase in university admissions. According to the latest data from the Ministry of Education and the National Bureau of Statistics, despite fluctuations in China's birth rate, the total number of admissions to higher education has continued to rise from 2020 to 2025. In 2024, there was a net increase of 256,000 undergraduate students compared to the previous year, and in 2025, a net increase of 30,000 students compared to the previous year. In 2025, ordinary undergraduate universities introduced 1,839 new majors, primarily focusing on strategic emerging fields such as artificial intelligence, low-altitude economy, and quantum technology. At the same time, 1,428 majors that were disconnected from market demand were eliminated, resulting in a net increase of 411 majors.

Graduate education has experienced the most significant expansion in recent years, showcasing distinct structural characteristics. Professional master's degrees have become the dominant force: according to the 'Development Plan for Professional Degree Graduate Education (2020-2025)', by 2025, the enrollment scale for professional master's degrees is expected to reach approximately two-thirds of the total master's enrollment scale. In 2024, doctoral admissions exceeded 170,000.

Over the past few decades, Chinese universities have significantly expanded admissions, with the establishment of majors lagging behind market demands. This mismatch has resulted in a substantial waste of educational resources, and a considerable proportion of university graduates are facing structural unemployment, placing the burden on individual families.

From the Great Northern Wilderness to technician training programs, the despair of historical cycles is being repeated.

In 1968, 17 million urban educated youth heeded Mao Zedong's call to 'go to the countryside' for 're-education by the poor and lower-middle peasants.' Fast forward to 2026, under Xi Jinping's new era, Beijing has introduced six full-time technician programs for university students, encouraging graduates with bachelor's and master's degrees to 'return to the furnace' and enrol in technical schools, where they can earn certificates in 1-2 years to enter the workforce. Various regions are implementing similar measures.

Different times, yet the same narrative. The devaluation of education has led to highly educated individuals facing both political and economic setbacks, with youth being reshaped by the system and engaging in a reverse trend of 'further education.' With 12.7 million graduates, nearly half of the youth are unemployed; who bears the cost?

The employment anxiety of university graduates is a major political concern for the government, linked to performance metrics. In places like Beijing, various strategies are being proposed to boost employment rates, such as allowing bachelor's degree holders to pursue specialised diplomas, encouraging master's graduates to attend technical schools, and offering dual degrees. After investing a few more tens of thousands over two years, the government claims this will enhance employment competitiveness. They even suggest that doctoral students return to study a different master's degree, promoting the idea that 'skills do not weigh one down,' implying that job hunting will be easier afterwards.

The Xi Jinping administration has stooped to such depths, misleading university students without consultation. The government has devastated the economy, resulting in stagnation and internal competition across various sectors, with weak domestic demand. Instead of addressing its own shortcomings and tackling the root causes, it merely shifts blame and avoids accountability. One moment, it claims that university students cannot let go of the long gown of Kong Yiji, and the next, it asserts that students are overly ambitious and ill-prepared for social competition. Then it promotes a narrative of suffering aesthetics, urging young people to seek out hardship themselves.

Raising a college student costs a family nearly a million yuan, starting from kindergarten. After graduation, many struggle to find jobs that pay even three thousand yuan a month. Now, parents are expected to invest more money, believing that a technical school education will guarantee employment. Is the high school diversion merely an educational game? If that’s the case, we might as well shut down all universities. Who is really taking whose job? College graduates are unable to find work, yet parents are still compelled to spend money to help their children secure a future. Meanwhile, elderly individuals who participate in public square dancing can earn several thousand to ten thousand yuan a month. This systemic injustice in distribution, coupled with the rampant competition in society, is overlooked by the Xi Jinping administration, which instead chooses to invest hundreds of billions into AI, allowing robots to take jobs from living people. It’s utterly ridiculous.

In 1968, the 'Down to the Countryside Movement' was initiated to tackle urban youth employment and rural labour issues, leaving behind collective trauma and historical scars for generations. Today, the Xi Jinping era attempts to address the surplus of college graduates by promoting technical schools, shifting the burden of systemic issues onto the youth for self-rescue, effectively turning them into cannon fodder for re-education. While history may not repeat itself exactly, it certainly has a way of reappearing in different forms.

(First published by the People News)△